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ABSTRACT Through their reading of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, William Blake, and Mary
Shelley arrive at a similar formula for their respective texts: the mismanagement, neglect, and
eventual abandonment of children by their fathers catalyses the development of monstrous
progeny in Shelley’s Frankenstein (1818/31), Blake’s Tiriel (1789), The Book of Urizen (1794),
and The Four Zoas (1795–1804). In particular, both Blake and Shelley pick up on Rousseau’s
concerns about the mishandling of children’s bodies as part of contemporary nursing prac-
tices in Émile, as well as the way in which the vision of a self-led educational programme is
continually undermined by the fear of pedagogical mismanagement. While Blake and Shelley
are rarely brought together in critical discussions, this paper, by looking specifically at the
physical and psychological formation of children within the context of father–son relation-
ships, hopes to provide an analytical key which will unlock the way both Romantic writers
incorporated personal, pedagogical, and philosophical material from Rousseau in their family-
orientated texts.
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Mary Shelley was well acquainted with the pedagogicaland political philosophy of Jean-Jacques Rousseau: shehad read Julie; or the New Eloise (1761), Émile; or, On
Education (1762), Essays on the Origin of Languages (1781), and
his Confessions Part 1 (1782) and Part 2 (1789).1 In fact, Shelley
had read Rousseau’s Confessions just a year before commencing
Frankenstein (1818/1831),2 with her journal entries revealing that
she continued to reread parts of this ‘invaluable book.’ She was
not alone: Rousseau’s influence is tangible in the works of the
first-generation Romantic poets William Wordsworth and
Samuel Taylor Coleridge as well as the ‘Villa Diodati’ group.3
William Blake was equally familiar with the Genevan philo-
sopher’s works,4 though less receptive.5 First mentioned in The
Song of Los (1795) and then again in Milton (1804–11)6 and
Jerusalem (1804–20),7 he is subject to persistent ridicule with
Blake condemning ‘The Book written by Rousseau calld his
Confessions [a]s an apology & cloke for his sin & not a confes-
sion’ (J 738 iii.52.53–5). Among the Romantics such vitriol is
certainly singular, yet Mary Shelley did not read Rousseau’s work
without misgivings. In fact, it is remarkable how similarly Shelley
and Blake view Rousseau’s abandonment of his children in
Confessions and how they subsequently deal with father–son
relationships in their respective prose and poetry.8
This thematic concern has, however, remained largely unad-
dressed. As late as the beginning of the twenty-first century, Mark
Lussier could comment that William Blake and Mary Shelley
were ‘two writers rarely brought into critical coincidence’ (2000,
p. 166). In part, this is because they provide such convenient
chronological bookends to Romantic investigations.9 Even so,
when they are brought together, The Book of Urizen (1794) is
generally the only Blakean text read alongside Frankenstein.10
The common exegesis then bifurcates along the following modes
of enquiry: either claiming that Urizen, by isolating himself and
creating the world according to an Enlightenment blueprint, is a
prototypal Frankenstein figure; or, that the attempt made by
Frankenstein’s creature to find a mate mirrors the ontological
division into Emanations and Spectres.11
Blake and Shelley’s familiarity with Rousseau, coupled with
Rousseau’s preoccupation with pedagogy and phylogeny, pro-
vides an additional interpretative key for a cross-textual analy-
sis.12 Specifically, Rousseau’s concern about the mishandling of
children’s bodies as part of contemporary nursing practices in
Émile, as well as the way in which his vision of a self-led edu-
cational programme is continually undermined by the fear of
pedagogical mismanagement, can be read as the practical context,
which frames the monstrous relationships between Tiriel and his
children in Blake’s Tiriel (1789), Los and his son, Orc, in The
Book of Urizen and The Four Zoas (1795–1804), as well as
Alphonse and his son, Victor, and Victor and his surrogate son,
the creature, in Shelley’s Frankenstein. By moving beyond the
standard Urizen/Frankenstein axis, there is scope to explore these
monstrous parental dynamics.
Rousseau’s contribution to the eighteenth-century pedagogical
revolution was part of a wider reform movement, which had
sprung up during the mid-seventeenth-century.13 Building upon
the philosophical groundwork of the Spanish humanist Juan Luis
Vives,14 Francis Bacon,15 Descartes,16 and the Czech philosopher
Jan Comenius,17 the 1640s alone saw educational tracts published
in England by Hezekiah Woodward, John Milton,18 William
Petty, John Dury, and John Hall. By the end of the century, John
Locke would publish his influential Some Thoughts Concerning
Education (1693).
In Some Thoughts, Locke begins by warning that ‘The little, and
almost insensible Impressions on our tender Infancies, have very
important and lasting Consequences’ and ‘that of all the Men […]
Nine parts of Ten are what they are, Good or Evil, useful or not,
by their Education’ (p. 2). Far from being born with an innate
disposition, temperament is shaped by the pedagogue. The child’s
impressionability is further emphasised through Locke’s
description of how the ‘gentle application of the hand turns the
flexible Waters’ of the child’s mind ‘into Chanels, that make them
take quite contrary Courses.’ The thematic principle of the tabula
rasa—which posits that the new-born’s mind is a blank slate, a
‘white Paper, or Wax, to be moulded and fashioned as one
pleases’ (p. 261)—permits the pedagogue to intellectually form
the mind and thereby create, as it were, the child anew.
Such was the success of Locke’s pedagogical philosophy that it
permeated eighteenth-century culture. The Tatler no. 181 (6th
June 1710), for instance, stressed that ‘the mind in infancy’ was
‘like the body in embryo, and receives impressions so forcible,
that they are as hard to be removed […] as any mark, with which
the child is born’ (1822, p. 391). The Female Spectator no. 21
(1745) similarly adhered to the Lockean belief that an adult’s
moral state is subject to its formative development in childhood
(Haywood, 1999, p. 263). While The Spectator no. 215 (6th
November 1711) compared the child to unpolished marble,
which shews none of its inherent beauties, until the skill of
the polisher [i.e., pedagogue] fetches out the colours, makes
the surface shine, and discovers every ornamental cloud,
spot and vein that runs through the body of it (1776, p. 202).
As a result, ‘[e]ducation […] when it works upon a noble mind,
draws out to view every latent virtue and perfection, which
without such helps are never able to make their appearance’ (pp.
202–3).19
Rousseau sustains this interests by appropriating parts of
Locke’s philosophy in Émile.20 Rousseau agrees, for example, that
the objects a child is shown has a significant impact upon his
intellectual and emotional development (1918, p. 27); distin-
guishing, furthermore, between ideas, memory, and sensations in
the application of definite ideas to signs (p. 78), which grounds
Locke’s An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1689).
Similarly, in his description of how nurses bind and mould
infants’ heads, Rousseau captures the mid-eighteenth-century
scientific development of the tabula rasa:
It is said that nurses sometimes pretend to give the heads of
infants a more proper form by a sort of moulding; and we
suffer them to do this! It seems that our heads were badly
fashioned by the Author of Nature, and that they need to be
made over, outwardly by nurses and inwardly by
philosophers! (p. 10).
Nature has produced a human frame, which corresponds to the
requirements of the human mind—a key condition in the privi-
leging of ‘natural man [a]s complete in himself’ (p. 5)—but
mankind, in an attempt to improve upon nature’s design, refa-
shions the child’s body and thereby impoverishes the mental
capacities, which are, at a later date, further bent and warped by
proselytising philosophers.
In a semantic shift from the ‘outwardly’ physical to the
‘inwardly’ psychological, Rousseau evidences a thematic concern
—which Locke addresses as well, admitting that while ‘our main
care should be about the inside, yet the clay Cottage is not to be
neglected’ (1693, p. 2)—for his entire treatise: the malformation
of the child’s body directly relates to the intellectual stunting of
cognitive development.
What’s more, Rousseau believed that the infant, as soon as he is
born, begins to learn from those around him and from the objects
he is shown. It therefore follows if the first attentive adult is a
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nurse, then ‘our first teacher is our nurse’ (p. 9). Not only can the
nurse deform the infant body, but she also has the capacity to
deform the infant’s mind. Later in Book 1, Rousseau attempts to
mitigate the nurse’s role by suggesting that the infant, ‘[b]efore he
can speak, before he can understand, […] is already instructing
himself’ and that ‘the moment he knows his nurse he has already
acquired much knowledge’ (p. 25). This a-posteriori epistemology
is based upon Rousseau’s prioritisation of experience—the
infant’s interaction with people and objects and his ability ‘to seek
or to shun’ that which produces ‘our sensations’ (p. 4) —over
pedagogical nurture. However, if the nurse determines the free-
dom of the infant’s body and, subsequently, the experiences
available to the infant, then the nurse determines physical, as well
as mental well-being.
This is why Rousseau is alarmed by the ‘inaction and constraint
imposed on the limbs of a child,’ such as swaddling, because it
‘prevent[s] him from growing strong, and weaken[s] his con-
stitution’ (pp. 10–1). Instead, Rousseau celebrates those countries
where ‘extravagant precautions are not taken’ because this creates
a cohort of ‘men [who] are all tall, strong, and well-proportioned’;
in his own country, where children suffer from injurious nursing
practices, there are ‘swarms [of] the hump-packed, the lame, the
knock-kneed, and the sickly—with all sorts of patched-up men’
(p. 11).
While nature produces healthy and robust constitutions, the
nurse and the pedagogue interfere and disrupt the physiological
and psychological harmony: ‘[t]o form this rare creature, what
have we to do? Much, doubtless, but chiefly to prevent anything
from being done’ (pp. 7–8). Rousseau describes unnecessary
interference as ‘hasten[ing] to deform it [the body] in a press’—
the metaphor is repeated (p. 91)—and of creating a situation,
which is ‘more unfortunate than a criminal in chains’ (p. 11). The
visceral language further highlights the interrelationship between
somatic inhibition and mental degeneration. William Blake suc-
cinctly encapsulates this phenomenon by utilising Rousseau’s
penal metaphor in ‘London’ when describing those ‘mind-forg’d
manacles’ (SE 128 8), while Rousseau himself, in The Reveries of
the Solitary Walker, is also befittingly reminded of the aban-
donment of his own children while hearing about the malevo-
lence of criminals (1992, p. 123).
Rousseau fathered five children with Thérèse Levasseur, his
domestic partner, but left them all to a Paris orphanage. Although
this was not an uncommon practice among the newly monied
middle classes (Fuchs, 1984, pp. 63–4), Rousseau unconvincingly
attempts to justify himself by invoking Plato’s proposal that
children would benefit from state education: ‘I truly saw no harm
in it. Taken all in all, I chose for my children what was best for
them, or what I believed to be so’ (2000, p. 348).21 The reality of
an eighteenth-century orphanage differed significantly from
Rousseau’s utopian expectations. As Patrick Coleman notes, ‘[a]
lthough survival prospects for children entrusted to foundling
homes were not good, many people wanted to believe them better
than they actually were’ (2000, xviii). Rousseau’s equivocation
that he did what was best for his children, ‘or what I believed to be
so’ (emphasis added), can be read as such an admission.22
While Rousseau launches a staunch defence of his own ‘true
feelings of justice’ at the end of Confessions, concluding that ‘[n]
ever for a single moment in his life could Jean-Jacques have been
without sentiment, without pity, an unnatural father’ (2000, p.
347), his profound sense of guilt resurfaces in Reveries. During
the eulogy of Mme Geoffrin, Rousseau’s thoughts wander to his
own children as Monsieur P. ‘turned on the pleasure that Mme G.
took in seeing children’:
[He] accused all those who did not have the same fondness
of having a bad natural temperament and of being wicked
—to the point of saying that if those being led to the gallows
or to the torture wheel were to be asked about it, all would
acknowledge they had not loved children (1992, p. 123).
The next day, while walking to École-Militaire, Rousseau
reflects that ‘the sole pretext of bringing this brochure to me’ was
because ‘I had placed my children in the foundling home.’
Rousseau (sub)consciously associates his own actions with that of
the criminals, for he objects to being ‘misrepresent[ed] […] as an
unnatural father […who] evidently hated children.’
In Émile, it appears that Rousseau’s decision to employ chains
as signifiers of mental incarceration (1918, p. 44) and tyrannical
preceptors (p. 87) is bound up with his ideas of fatherhood. The
adoption of such a consistent rhetorical technique is not simply
evidence for the metaphorical elucidation of pedagogical obser-
vations but, rather, a deliberate emphasis on the epistemological
symbiosis of physiology and psychology. It is systematically
reinforced throughout Émile, with Rousseau habitually relying on
such formulations when reprimanding the careless pedagogue: ‘it
is not the criminal who should be hung, but he who compels him
to become such’ (p. 174).
Rousseau may have had another personal circumstance in
mind. Recognising the role formative ideas ‘sown […] during
childhood’ have upon an adult’s character, Rousseau recalls at the
beginning of Confessions how much his older brother suffered as
a result of inattention and neglect (2000, pp. 9–10).23 The phy-
logeny of family life in Confessions builds upon the pedagogical
foundations of Émile, but there is also an interesting anthro-
pological echo here of the development of natural man into a
social being which preoccupied his Discourse and which he
continued to address in The Social Contract (1762). Rousseau is
clearly aware of the paternal pedagogue’s role in leading his
charge away from the ‘dissolute ways’ (p. 9) that befell his brother
and towards his own ‘seed[s] of heroism and virtue, which my
father and my fatherland and Plutarch had sown there during my
childhood’ (p. 346).
The physical, intellectual, as well as moral development of the
child is bound up with the care taken by the paternal pedagogue.
In Émile, Rousseau warns that, from birth, the child should be
incorporated within the filial fold to ensure the successful pro-
motion of healthy proportions and passions:
Would you, then, have him preserve his original form?
Guard it from the moment of the child’s birth. As soon as
born take possession of him, and do not give him up until
he is a man... As the real nurse is the mother, the real
preceptor is the father (1918, p. 15).
Although Rousseau is not advocating physical interference, he
does expound the need to protect the human frame: ‘let the child
pass from the hands of one [the mother] into the hands of the
other [the father].’ As Adriana Benzaquen notes, the eighteenth-
century demanded of parents a ‘new responsibility’ to ensure the
child’s well-being, ‘for the child’s own sake, for the sake of the
family and for the sake of the state’ (2006, p. 24).
The private, familial space became child-orientated—one
might say child-dominated—with the parents’ time specifically
directed towards developing their offspring. Rousseau’s figurative
language exemplifies the tactility of such pedagogy; and, with the
concerns previously expressed regarding the malformation of
infant bodies in mind, Rousseau now begins to amalgamate these
concerns with parenthood.
For instance, when defining the father’s role, Rousseau evokes
the biblical parallel of God forming Adam from clay: ‘A teacher!
What an exalted soul he should be! In truth, to form a man, one
must be either a father or more than a man’ (pp. 16–7).24 The
father/Father, prefiguring the imagery with which Victor
PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-019-0286-x ARTICLE
PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS |            (2019) 5:78 | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-019-0286-x |www.nature.com/palcomms 3
Frankenstein imbues his own creative task in Frankenstein (2003,
p. 55), must therefore ‘form a man’ correctly, avoiding costly
errors:
if Nature gives to a child’s brain that plasticity, which
renders it capable of receiving all sorts of impressions, it is
not for the purpose of engraving upon it the names of
kings, dates, terms in heraldry […] but it is in order that all
the ideas, which he can conceive […] may serve him for
self-conduct during his whole life (p. 79).
Rousseau echoes Locke but presses the material epistemology
further by remonstrating with those educational programmes
which insist upon ‘engraving’ useless historical facts upon the
‘child’s brain.’ If, as The Spectator claimed, the child is like
marble, then the pedagogue has the capacity to ruin the quality of
the stone as much as he has the capacity to polish and refine the
block into a well-formed adult.
Rousseau plays with this materiality as part of his discussion of
the transferal of knowledge:
It is said that Hermes engraved on columns the elements of
the sciences in order to protect his discoveries from the
deluge. If he had thoroughly imprinted them in the heads of
men they would have been preserved there through
tradition. Well-prepared brains are the monuments on
which human knowledges are most permanently engraved
(p. 162).
While in Book 2 information is relayed to the child by
‘engraving’ pointless heraldic terms, in Book 3 Rousseau laments
the fact that worthwhile ‘elements of the sciences’ have not been
‘permanently engraved’ on the collective consciousness of man-
kind. In both instances, information is seen to be part of a
mechanical process whereby the pedagogue is tasked with filling
in the blanks of the child’s brain—writing upon Locke’s tabula
rasa as it were—to produce ‘a store-house of knowledge’ (p. 80).
By Book 4, if Rousseau is able to observe in his protégé ‘[t]he true
principles of the just, the true models of the beautiful […]
engraved in his understanding’ (p. 229) (emphasis added), this is
only because the attentive pedagogue has been judicious in the
choice of objects and in the choice of experiences, which have
been permitted to the pupil (pp. 79–80).
Far from supporting a self-led pedagogical programme, the
language in Émile betrays an authoritative and dogmatic
approach, which is dependent upon physical metaphors to
describe psychological phenomenon. What’s more, Rousseau
envisages a pedagogue akin to a Pygmalion sculptor, whereby the
child is shaped and moulded into an idealised form: ‘I will press
him to my heart while shedding over him tears of tenderness, and
I will say to him: ‘You are my all, my child, my workmanship’’ (p.
239). Of course, if this process is mishandled then a monster,
rather than a model, is produced.
If, then, eighteenth-century parents were expected to become
educational facilitators, and if Rousseau is so definite in his
declaration that the father should act as ‘the real preceptor’ (p.
15), why did he fail to educate his own children? It is this
question that specifically piques both Shelley and Blake, and
which brings Shelley to refer to Rousseau’s actions as ‘criminal’25
and Blake to call his Confessions a ‘cloke for his sin’ (J 738
ii.52.55). In fact, one of the reasons for Victor Frankenstein’s ill-
fated project in Frankenstein is because he lacked a paternal
pedagogue to guide his youthful interests; for, while Victor shows
a predilection for natural philosophy, his journey into charnel-
houses results from his father’s inattention.
Victor acknowledges that, as he was ‘self-taught,’ he was ‘left
to struggle with a child’s blindness’ (2003, p. 42). He claims that
‘Natural philosophy is the genius that has regulated my fate’
(p. 40), but this is only set in motion by the father’s inability to
carry out his duty. Both the mariner Walton, whose letters
frame Frankenstein, and Victor’s creature voice similar con-
cerns. Walton claims that his daydreams have begun to run
wild, and that he requires ‘a friend who would have sense
enough […] to regulate my mind’ (p. 20), and the creature
complains, ‘where were my friends and relations? No father had
watched my infant days, no mother had blessed me with smiles
and caresses’ (p. 124).
Mary Poovey has noted that Shelley, like contemporary
Lockean philosophers, ‘asserts that circumstances activate and
direct an individual’s capacity for imaginative activity; the incli-
nation […] thus formed then constitutes the basis of identity’
(1980, p. 334). The desires stirred in childhood form the adult’s
character, but this ontological foundation can become a perverted
idolatry of its original enthusiasm: operating according to its own
impetus, childhood desires become adult obsessions. Mary Shelley
therefore characterises Victor’s predilection for natural philoso-
phy as the origin of a malevolent fervour and his imagination as
primarily egotistical. It is only through ‘the give-and-talk of
domestic relationships’ that such ambitions can be regulated.
At first, Victor recounts how his curiosity was piqued:
The world was to me a secret, which I desired to divine…
earnest research to learn the hidden laws of nature, gladness
akin to rapture, as they were unfolded to me, are among the
earliest sensations I can remember (p. 38).
Rousseau, too, tells his readers to make their pupils ‘attentive to
natural phenomena’ and to nourish this ‘curiosity’ by ‘[a]sk[ing]
questions that are within his comprehension, and leave him to
resolve them’ (1918, p. 137). Victor, like Rousseau’s idealised
pupil, searches nature to uncover its ‘hidden laws,’ but whereas
Rousseau’s pupil has an attentive pedagogue, Victor is alone.
Victor’s pronominal language highlights his isolation: ‘[t]he
world was to me a secret, which I desired to divine,’ ‘the hidden
laws… were unfolded to me,’ and these pleasant memories ‘are
among the earliest sensations I can remember’ (emphasis added).
Victor single-mindedly pursues his interests, driven by a perso-
nal/egotistical drive ‘to divine’ nature’s laws.
Having stumbled upon a volume of Agrippa at an inn near
Thonon, Victor’s ‘father looked carelessly at the title page of my
book and said, ‘Ah! Cornelius Agrippa! My dear Victor, do not
waste your time upon this; it is sad trash’’ (p. 40). Victor is clearly
put out by his father’s rejection, but this only makes him more
determined to delve into the works of Paracelsus and Albertus
Magnus (p. 41). These natural philosophers then become Victor’s
‘new preceptors’ (p. 42) and occupy the vacant role of the
paternal pedagogue.
Additionally, it is also worthwhile noting that while in the 1818
edition of the text it is the father who explains to his son that the
tree struck by lightning has been brought low by ‘Electricity,’ in
the 1831 revision it is ‘a man of great research in natural philo-
sophy’ who explains ‘electricity and galvanism’ and thereby
‘threw greatly into the shade Cornelius Agrippa, Albertus Mag-
nus, and Paracelsus, the lords of my imagination’ (pp. 42–3). The
latter version makes the father’s initial dismissal of Agrippa even
more pivotal for he is thereafter unable to obviate his fault.
Because of his father’s pedagogical carelessness towards him in
youth, Victor isolates himself in later life—exemplified by his
solitary research at Ingolstadt—and secretes the things he should
share in the safe sphere of filial relationships deep within his own
soul. Victor turns inwards like many Romantic egotists, shunning
the outward universalising tendency advocated by Percy Shelley
in A Defence of Poetry. Indeed, as Victor takes leave of his family
and travels to university, he claims: ‘I was now alone… whither I
was going, I must form my own friends’ (p. 46).26
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Frankenstein’s creature similarly pinpoints his isolation as a
corrupting influence: ‘Believe me, Frankenstein: I was benevolent;
my soul glowed with love and humanity,’ he attests, ‘but am I not
alone, miserably alone’ (2003, p. 103). Then, while watching the
De Laceys, the creature complains ‘I required kindness and
sympathy… I did not believe myself unworthy of it’ (p. 134). Like
his creator, the creature requires a moderator to guide the
otherwise wayward mind from the doubts which arise from pri-
vate reflection. Far from advocating the segregation of pupils, like
the experimental approach taken to Émile’s education, Shelley is
warning her readers about the dangers of withdrawing from
society.
The creature, having learnt to read from his time at the De
Laceys’ cottage, continues his self-led education with John Mil-
ton’s Paradise Lost, a volume of Plutarch’s Lives, and Johann
Wolfgang von Goethe’s Sorrows of Werther. These texts produce
in the creature ‘an infinity of new images and feelings’ that raise
him both ‘to ecstasy’ as well as sink him ‘into the lowest dejec-
tion.’ He begins to speculate upon ‘what had hitherto been to me
obscure subjects,’ though finds these thoughts aroused ‘a never-
ending source of speculation and astonishment’ (pp. 130–1). Like
Victor who, after reading his books on natural philosophy, came
away ‘discontented and unsatisfied’ (p. 41), the creature is left
perplexed (p. 131). Such is the creature’s ontological restlessness
that the narrative descends into a barrage of abstract questioning:
‘What did this mean? Who was I? What was I? Whence did I
come? What was my destination?’ As the creature admits, ‘[t]
hese questions continually recurred, but I was unable to solve
them.’
Cutoff from the tender influence of a father, and beyond the
corrections of a pedagogue, the creature is driven to find a mate
as a companion:
I swear to you, by the earth, which I inhabit, and by you
that made me, that with the companion you bestow I will
quit the neighbourhood of man, and dwell, as it may
chance, in the most savage of places. My evil passions will
have fled, for I shall meet with sympathy! (p. 149).
The creature’s language, however, descends into a teleological
redundancy. He believes that by creating an Eve for the already-
fallen Adam a prelapsarian existence can (re)commence away
from the societal and political structures of the postlapsarian
world. Of course, this is impossible, as much as it is impossible for
a Blakean character to return to the State of Innocence once
they’ve progressed to the State of Experience,27 and the creature’s
anger at Frankenstein’s refusal evidences his true nature:
If I have no ties and no affections, hatred and vice must be
my portion… My vices are the children of a forced solitude
that I abhor; and my virtues will necessarily arise when I
live in communion with an equal […] and become linked to
the chain of existence and events, from which I am now
excluded (p. 150).
The creature abhors his figurative ‘children’ because they are
the ‘vices’ bred from ‘solitude.’ While Alphonse Frankenstein
neglected to direct his son’s studies (pp. 40–1), the creature’s self-
taught education fills his head with Miltonic rebellion (p. 132),
the melancholia of Werther (pp. 130–1), and the ‘high thoughts’
from Plutarch (p. 131): ‘I ought to be thy Adam,’ he complains,
‘but I am rather the fallen angel, whom thou drivest from joy for
no misdeed’ (p. 103).28 Instead of regulating those new emotions,
the creature’s sensitivity is further heightened after reading Vic-
tor’s scientific journal (p. 132). The creature sinks deeper into
‘despondency and solitude,’ crying out ‘[w]hy did you form a
monster so hideous that even you turned from me in disgust?’ (p.
133). Feeling once more the bitterness of the child’s abandonment
by the biological father, the creature accepts Plutarch, Milton, and
Goethe as his literary fathers.29
Mary Shelley draws Rousseau’s pedagogical practice to its fatal
conclusion: the isolated child shaped by a self-led educational
programme will succumb to the cacophony of his own thoughts
and feelings.30 Furthermore, Rousseau’s concerns about the cor-
relation between a malformed body and a weak institution is
perhaps most vividly articulated through the creature, which was
made from the ‘collect[ion] of bones from charnel-houses’ (2003,
p. 55).31 As John Locke warns, ‘Let Nature have scope to fashion
the Body as she thinks best; she works of her self a great deal
better, and exacter, than we can direct her,’ adding that ‘if
Women were themselves to frame the Bodies of their Children in
their wombs […] we should as certainly have no perfect children
born’ (1693, p. 10). Rousseau similarly opens Émile with the
declaration that ‘[e]verything is good as it comes from the hands
of the Author of Nature; but everything degenerates in the hands
of man’ (1918, p. 1). In fact, although Victor took ‘such infinite
pains and care’ and believed his creature’s ‘limbs were in pro-
portion’ and that ‘his features [were] beautiful’ (p. 58), he ends up
cursing ‘the hands that formed you!’ (p. 104).
Los, in Blake’s The Book of Urizen, is employed in a similar task
of creation, binding ‘the formless unmeasurable death’ (BU 247
7.9) of Urizen’s fallen spirit before ossifying ‘every change/With
rivets of iron & brass’ (8.10-1). Los continues by ‘forging chains
new & new’ (248 10.17), creating ‘A vast Spine’ (p. 37), ‘Ribs, like
a bending cavern’ (pp. 249 39), and ‘bones of solidness’ (p. 40).
The rest of Chapter IV[b] follows the formation of Urizen’s heart,
brain, eyes, ears, nostrils, stomach, tongue, and limbs, detailing
the fall into corporeality of the once spiritual beings. Then, like
Victor who ‘[u]nable to endure the aspect of the being I had
created […] rushed out of the room’ (2003, p. 58), Los is unable
to look upon the physical manifestation of his creative labour: ‘In
terrors Los shrunk form his task: /His great hammer fell from his
hand’ (250 13.20-1).
Although Urizen is not Los’ child—Urizen is a separated
portion of Los himself ‘rent from his side’ (246 6.4)—his treat-
ment of, and reaction to, Urizen’s newly formed physical exis-
tence is a foreshadowing of his future relationship with his son,
Orc. In fact, although the creature, which Victor brings to life in
Frankenstein is not his biological child either, there are similar
parallels between Victor-as-creator and Alphonse-as-father. For
example, there’s something not altogether pleasant in Victor’s
self-identification as his parent’s ‘plaything’ when he remembers
his ‘father’s smile of benevolent pleasure’:
I was their plaything and their idol, and something better—
their child, the innocent and helpless creature bestowed on
them by Heaven, whom to bring up to good, and whose
future lot was in their hands […] according as they fulfilled
their duties towards me (2003, p. 35).
The opportunity to rectify his father’s failure is, in part, what
drives Victor’s scientific activity which is, from the start, firmly
couched in the semantics of family life: ‘A new species would
bless me as its creator… No father could claim the gratitude of his
child so completely as I should deserve theirs’ (p. 55). Indeed,
Victor’s language echoes that of The Female Spectator no. 7
(1745):
Our Parents, as next to Heaven the Authors of our Being,
and Protectors of our helpless Infancy, certainly claim the
first and greatest share of our Love and Gratitude… Love
and Respect to them are Duties so known and universally
confessed, that where a Person is visibly wanting in either
of these, he is deservedly looked upon as a Monster (1755,
p. 37).
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Victor, as I have argued, blames his father for not ‘tak[ing] the
pains to explain […] that the principles of Agrippa had been
entirely exploded’ and for failing to teach him ‘a modern system
of science’ (p. 40). Indeed, Victor isolates this moment as the
catalyst for ‘the train of my ideas’, which produced ‘the fatal
impulse that led to my ruin’ (p. 41). His subsequent abandonment
of the creature can therefore be read as a dramatic aggravation of
his own father’s carelessness.32
However, to return to The Book of Urizen, it is inside Eni-
tharmon’s womb where the embryonic Orc ‘lay like a Worm…/
To be moulded into existence’ (BU 253 19.21-3). Orc’s father, Los,
stands ready to shape the child’s mind by ‘bath[ing] him in
springs of sorrow’ (254 20.4), but then finds that ‘A tight’ning
girdle grew, /Around his [own] bosom’:
In sobbings
He burst the girdle in twain,
But still another girdle
Oppressd his bosom, In sobbings
Again he burst it. Again
Another girdle succeeds
The girdle was form’d by day;
By night was burst in twain
(254 20.9-17).
The girdles fall onto a rock and form a chain, which binds Orc
(18–20). Los and Enitharmon then take Orc to the top of a
mountain where ‘They chain’d his young limbs […] With the
Chain of Jealousy/Beneath Urizen’s deathful shadow’ (23–5).
Rousseau warned his readers in Émile how nurses were prone to
mould infants’ heads, but Los and Enitharmon fail to correct
these harmful practices. What’s more, Blake recycles Rousseau’s
penal imagery as Los and Enitharmon bind their son with the
Chain of Jealousy, a malicious link which infiltrates the rela-
tionship between father and son, mother and son, as well as
between father and mother.
Committed ‘Beneath Urizen’s deathful shadow,’ the chaining of
Orc sets a precedent for future filial relationships:
Urizen sicken’d to see
His eternal creations appear
Sons & daughters of sorrow
(255 23.8-10).
This scene is repeated in ‘Night the Fifth’ of The Four Zoas,
where Enitharmon gives birth to ‘a terrible Child’ (FZ 346
v.58.17). Los turns his back on Orc and instead starts building
Golgonooza, the city of art. After 14 years, Los returns to his son
but ‘beheld malignant fires/In his young eyes discerning plain that
Orc plotted his death’ (8–9). Once more, Los is overcome with
grief and once amore ‘a tightening girdle grew/Around his bosom
like a bloody cord’ (10–1), whereupon Los takes his son to the top
of a mountain and, after binding him with the Chain of Jealousy,
crucifies him to the spot (pp. 348–9 19–30).
Once Orc is fastened, his ‘rage flamed tenfold forth rending/
Roaring redounding. Loud Loud Louder & Louder’ (349 61.2-3),
scaring his parents ‘down into the deeps & into his [Los’]
labyrinth’ (8). Los and Enitharmon flee from the monster they
have created, following a subterraneous passage back to Golgo-
nooza where they ‘Felt all the sorrow Parents feel’ (351 62.10). It
is at this point that Los repents and promises to release his son.
However, when he arrives at the mountaintop:
Lo the young limbs had strucken root into the rock
& strong
Fibres had from the Chain of Jealousy inwove themselves…
In vain they strove now to unchain. In vain with bitter tears
To melt the chain of Jealousy
(22–7).
Los’ mistreatment of his son cannot be undone: the father’s
inhumanity, his monstrosity, has twisted and perverted the
human form until the Chain of Jealousy ‘became one with him a
living Chain’ (352 63.3).
In the early narrative poem Tiriel, Blake addresses a similar
concern. The aged monarch Tiriel blames his sons for the death
of his wife, Myratana, as well as his own demise: ‘Serpents not
sons. wreathing around the bones of Tiriel/Ye worms of death
feasting upon your aged parents flesh’ (T 86 1.22-3). As a last act
of cruelty, Tiriel curses his sons (p. 87 43–51) before he takes his
leave to find the vales of Har. He spares his daughter, Hela, but
fearing that she will disobey his commands, reminds her of her
‘fathers curse/That thou shalt feel worms in thy marrow creeping
thro thy bones’ (20–1).
Hela condemns Tiriel as ‘cruel,’ an ‘avenger’ (p. 99 23), and the
‘murderer of thy helpless children’ (p. 100 35). In retaliation,
Tiriel curses his daughter so that ‘snakes rise from thy bedded
locks’ (43). While at the beginning of the poem Tiriel’s identifi-
cation of his sons as ‘serpents’ was metaphorical, his language
increasingly takes on the creative quality of being able to manifest
it physically.
The material reality of the individual’s psychological state is
further emphasised at the end of the poem where, having made it
to the vales of Har, Tiriel complains that he has become ‘subtil as
a serpent in paradise’ and that this ‘paradise is falln & a drear
sandy plain / Returns my thirsty hissings in a curse’ (p. 103
8.37–40). Tiriel is only ‘subtil as a serpent,’ but thereafter his
environment takes on the aesthetics of the ‘paradise’ to which he
referred as part of the original metaphor. He himself becomes the
snake, whereupon the ‘sandy plain’ of his new existence ‘Returns
my thirsty hissings.’
For Blake, the individual’s mental state affects reality as we
perceive it as part of the external world. Indeed, the relationship
between the body and mind provides a thematic marker for his
entire mythopoeia. In Tiriel’s last speech, Blake continues by
combining Locke’s epistemological foundation with Rousseau’s
warning about the intellectual consequences of somatic
mishandling:
And why men bound beneath the heavens in a reptile form
A worm of 60 winters creeping on the dusky ground
The child springs from the womb. the father ready stands
to form
The infant head while the mother idle plays with her dog on
her couch…
The father forms a whip to rouze the sluggish senses to act
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And scourges off all youthful fancies from the new-
born man
(p. 103 8.23-30).
The syntax allows for an anthropological progression of the
‘reptile form’ into ‘A worm,’ ‘The child,’ ‘the new-born man,’ and
eventually into a ‘drone’ (33). The evolutionary perversion of the
child’s maturation maps his mistreatment at the hands of his
parents: from birth, the child is moulded by the father who shapes
‘The infant head’ physically and psychologically.
Blake accentuates this dual application (emphasised by the
homonymic noun ‘form’ and verb ‘to form’) through the meta-
phor of the father’s ‘whip’, which is made ‘to rouze the sluggish
senses to act.’ The mental faculties, susceptible to physical force,
are malformed by the tyrannical father who circumscribes free-
dom of movement and freedom of thought in order to bend the
child’s will to his own: ‘Then walks the weak infant in sorrow
compelled to number footsteps’ (31).
Blake agrees with Rousseau that this practice is not only det-
rimental to the physical well-being of the child but also inhibits
intellectual growth. However, while Rousseau implicates nurses,
Blake attacks the father who combines such physical malforma-
tion with psychological repression:
[Tiriel] evolves from an infant whose desire for love and
nurture turns to envious rage through maternal neglect, to
the child whose fantasies are repressed by the father, to the
rebellious son, and finally to the cursing father-figure, who
will cause the pattern to be repeated in the next generation
(Webster, 1983, p. 47).
The neglected child becomes a neglectful father who perpe-
tuates a chain of monstrous behaviour, which ruins the moral
state of the family and, as an aftereffect, the welfare of society. By
implying that when the child is born the senses are activated
solely through ‘difficulty & pain,’ Blake is conflating the roles of
the nurse and the father: physical mistreatment leads to psy-
chological degeneration which creates the monstrous ‘new-born
man.’
The incompetence of the father illustrates for Blake that the
experience of adulthood is no guarantee of a spiritual superiority
to the innocence of childhood. Perhaps one of Blake’s biggest
concerns with Rousseau’s pedagogical philosophy is the refusal to
allow children intellectual distinction, specifically the capacity to
intuit the spiritual dimensions of life.33 In particular, Blake
attacked the segregation and ideological separation of children
from adults. As Frances Ferguson notes, ‘[t]he Rousseauvian
stages that Blake so derisively called ‘ratios’ accorded a child
reason by segmenting the child’s reason out of a nearly universal
reason’ (2003, p. 217). Indeed, while Rousseau stresses physical
and psychological freedom, this freedom is limited to the epis-
temological framework of the child’s (un)intellectual mind.
This is evidenced in Émile where Rousseau challenges Locke’s
‘grand maxim’ that we should ‘reason with children’:
Of all the faculties of man, reason […] is that which is
developed with the most difficulty and the latest… The
master-work of a good education is to make a reasonable
man, and we propose to train up a child through the
reason! That is to begin at the end (pp. 52–3).34
For Rousseau, the child is unreasonable because his formative
years are bound to a tender frame which is only able to support a
weak intuition: ‘[w]e are born weak; we have need of strength: we
are born destitute of everything; we have need of assistance: we
are born stupid; we have need of judgement’ (p. 2).35 Blake dis-
agrees. The child’s spiritual capacity is not diminished simply
because he is a child.36 Nevertheless, if Rousseau is adamant that
the physical well-being of the infant’s body is a prerequisite for
intellectual stimulation, then his dereliction of duty—with regards
to his own children—makes him ‘guilty of a crime’ (prefiguring
Shelley’s own accusation):
He who cannot fulfil the duties of a father has no right to
become such. Neither poverty, nor business, nor fear of the
world, can excuse him from the duty of supporting and
educating his own children. (p. 16).37
In Confessions, Rousseau ‘thank[s] heaven for having preserved
them [his children] from their father’s destiny’ (2000, p. 348), yet
his own experiences, especially witnessing the degeneration of his
brother, do not sit comfortably with his decision to leave his
children to an orphanage. While Rousseau is confident that he
has saved them from the negative influence of Thérèse’s family
and the ill-suited charge of Mme d’Épinay and Mme de Lux-
embourg (pp. 347–8),38 Blake and Shelley both demonstrate how
he had potentially delivered them up to a far worse fate.
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Notes
1 Hogle, 2016, 45–6. Shelley would also have come across her mother’s reactions in A
Vindication of the Rights of Woman (1792). Shelly read both her parents’ works
during her courtship with Percy Shelly (Clemit, 2003, p. 30).
2 The Penguin edition cited is based on the 1831 text.
3 Bloom, 1987, pp. 2–4; Clemit, 2003, p. 33; Giddey, 2004, p. 77.
4 David V. Erdman traces some of Blake’s nomenclature to Rousseau’s Discourse on
Inequality and Émile (1977, p. 252). Nicholas Williams argues that Rousseau provides
‘the backdrop for Blake’s composition of the Songs’ (1985, p. 38). Zachary Leader
finds Rousseauvian echoes in Tiriel (1981, pp. 23–4). It is likely that Blake was
familiar with Henry Fuseli’s Remarks on Rousseau (Erdman, 1977, p. 428). Kathleen
Raine also suggests that Blake became acquainted with Rousseau’s philosophy
through Mary Wollstonecraft (1991, p. 47). Through the bookseller Joseph Johnson,
Blake engraved plates for Wollstonecraft’s translation of C. G. Salzman’s Elements of
Morality (1790) and Original Stories (1791).
5 Blake classes Rousseau ‘among the villains of his milieu’ (Quinney, 2009, p. 20).
6 John Howard reads Milton 22.41 as a direct reference to Rousseau’s Confessions
(1976, p. 109; 273).
7 While Stewart Crehan argues that Blake’s ‘new-found libertarian ideas’ were ‘fired by
his reading of Rousseau’ (1984, p. 110), he admits in his analysis of Jerusalem that ‘[i]t
is Voltaire and Rousseau who are the real hypocrites’ (p. 319). Leonard Deen
similarly observes a turning away in the latter prophecies (1983, pp. 78–9). As Leo
Damrosch points out, Blake ‘saw both Voltaire and Rousseau as believers in natural
religion’ (2015, p. 121). The coupling of Voltaire and Rousseau was not uncommon
in England (Howard, 1976, p. 136).
8 Pamela Clemit observes in Victor’s treatment of his creature ‘parallels with
Rousseau’s life story’ (2003, p. 34), while Nicholas Williams notes how both Rousseau
and Blake are concerned with the ‘way in which seemingly caring […] voices come to
serve […] a more explicitly repressive social system’ (1985, p. 45).
9 See, for example, John Beer’s Romantic Consciousness: Blake to Mary Shelley (2003).
See also Cantor (1985, ix) and Lussier (2000, p. 166).
10 Cantor 1985, ix–x; Bloom, 1987, pp. 2–10; Sherwin, 1987, pp. 40–3; Lussier, 2000, pp.
166; 172; Cooper, 2013, p. 219.
11 The creature is ‘for one Romanticist a Blakean “spectre,” for another a Blakean
“emanation” (Sherwin, 1987, p. 40).
12 See Leader (1981, pp. 1–36) and Williams (1999, pp. 32–70) for Rousseau’s influence
on Blake’s Songs. David V. Erdman writes that the ‘Preludium’ of America was a
variation on the opening of Rousseau’s Social Contract (1977, pp. 258; 265) and that
Visions of the Daughters of Albion and The Book of Urizen are also indebted to
Rousseau (p. 259).
13 See Richardson (1989, p. 853), Dennis (2011, p. 204), and Leader (1981, pp. 22; 178)
for the significance of Locke and Rousseau to this debate.
14 Simon, 1979, p. 63.
15 John Adamson claims Francis Bacon as ‘the one man who set the thoughts of many
[…] upon school reform’ (1921, p. 17). Joan Simon notes that ‘[i]n republican
England after 1640 […] parliament seriously considered plans for educational reform
on Baconian lines’ (1979, p. 396).
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16 For the importance of Descartes’ mathematical pedagogy to educationists, see Jones
(2006, pp. 48–52).
17 ‘[A] vigorous correspondence was being carried on between Comenius and those who
held similar views in England’ (Freeman, 1961, p. 132).
18 Richard Greaves groups Milton with Comenius and Locke as the three big
seventeenth-century educational theorists (1969, p. 166).
19 The Spectator diverges from Locke’s tabula rasa theory, for it presupposes innate
qualities. However, Locke himself is contradictory in this regard, for he admits that
there are ‘various Tempers, different Inclinations, and particular Defaults, that are to
be found in Children’ and that ‘there are possibly scarce two Children, who can be
conducted by exactly the same method [of education]’ (p. 261).
20 Rousseau references Some Thoughts in his preface. He also echoes Locke’s tabula rasa
theory at the end of Book 1 (p. 40).
21 In Emile, Rousseau refers to ‘the Republic of Plato’ as ‘the finest work on education
ever written’ (p. 6).
22 Educational reformers rejected the institutionalisation of children in orphanages ‘on
the grounds that they were a financial burden to the state as well as detrimental to the
life and well-being of the children’ (Fuchs, 1984, p. 31). Rousseau, again, appears to
be aware of this when he acknowledges that he has ‘hand[ed] over my children to be
raised at public expense’ (p. 348).
23 Rousseau attempts to soften ‘[t]he extreme affection that was lavished upon me’ by
admitting that his brother was only ‘a little neglected’ (p. 9) but the diminutive
modifier rings hollow.
24 Rousseau would also have come across similar imagery in the works of his French
contemporaries, such as Julien Offray de La Mettrie who in Man a Machine (1747)
wrote that ‘Man is not moulded from a costlier clay; nature has used but one dough,
and has merely varied the leaven’ (1912, p. 117). In England, Joseph Glanvill had
described childhood as ‘the melted wax […] capable of any impression from the
document of our Teachers’ (1665, p. 95), while John Theobald was also comparing
children to a ‘dough’ that was ‘susceptible of all impressions’ in the prefatory pages of
The Young Wife’s Guide in the Management of Her Children (1764). Theobald states
that a robust child would become sickly through mismanagement, but that a sickly
child could also become robust through the right management. From the late 1740s,
there was a growing medical attention to the ‘preservation,’ ‘management,’ and
‘physical education’ of children (Benzaquen, 2006, p. 24).
25 qt. O’Rourke, 1989, p. 545.
26 Victor’s secretive project replicates Urizen’s ‘silent activity’ (BU 243 3.18-2).
27 In the ‘Geneva Manuscript,’ Rousseau writes that ‘nature’s gentle voice is no longer
an infallible guide for us, nor is the independence we have received from her a
desirable state… the happy life of the golden age was always a state foreign to the
human race’ (1978, pp. 158–9).
28 At times the creature self-identifies as either Adam (pp. 103, 132, 134) or Satan (pp.
132–3). Paul Sherwin refers to the creature as ‘a freakish hybrid of Milton’s Adam
and Satan’ (1987, p. 40).
29 ‘Through the books he reads, he discovers […] his intellectual parents,’ writes Anne
McWhir. ‘In a sense he is twice made—first through Frankenstein’s macabre piercing
together of fragments from the grave, then through the textual construction of his
own sense of self (1990, p. 74).
30 Blake, too, maps out the monstrous consequences of the individual’s withdrawal from
society and reliance upon books in The Book of Urizen, where Urizen sits ‘alone’ and
writes ‘in books formd of metals’ his laws under which future generations will suffer
(BU 244-5 4.24-40).
31 In an anthropological articulation of this moral development, The Spectator no. 246
(12th December 1711) and no. 408 (18th June 1712) claim that a child fed upon
goat’s milk with assume that animal’s uneven temper.
32 ‘Frankenstein’s rejection of his creature makes him guilty of a crime that made
Rousseau notorious: parental abandonment’ (Clemit, 2003, p. 34). As Judith
Weismann declares, ‘there is hell to pay, in Frankenstein, for the man who does not
put his family first’ (1976, p. 180).
33 See Dennis, 2011, pp. 215–6.
34 The term ‘master-work’ echoes the ‘workmanship’ (p. 239) and other sculptural
imagery throughout Émile.
35 Blake objects to Rousseau’s staged ontogenesis, which is reliant upon the somatic
development of ‘corporeal organs’: ‘[t]he understanding does not begin to form itself
till after some years, and when the corporeal organs have acquired a certain
consistence. The design of nature is therefore evidently to strengthen the body, before
the mind is exercised’ (1761, p. 260).
36 In fact, children’s voices often critique adult discourses (Richardson, 1989, p. 865).
For Blake, the child does not know less simply because he is a child because the
corrupting influence of society—with David V. Erdman referring to Rousseau as
‘Blake’s modern source’ (1977, p. 249)—may impair the adult’s perspicuity and
thereby lessen their spiritual receptivity.
37 There is a degree of self-admonishment and penitence when Rousseau adds, ‘Reader,
believe me when I predict that whoever has a heart and neglects such sacred duties
will long shed bitter tears over his mistake, and will never find consolation for it.’
38 Rousseau attempts to clear himself of blame in The Reveries of the Solitary Walker:
‘[h]ad I been indifferent about what would become of them, since I was incapable of
raising them myself, in my situation, I would have had to let them be raised by their
mother, who would have spoiled them, and by her family, who would have made
monsters of them’ (1992, p. 124).
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